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ABSTRACT
The Solar Maximum Repair Mission returned with the replaced
hardware that had been in low Earth orbit for over four years. The
materials of this returned hardware gave the aerosace community an
opportunity to study the realtime effects of atomic oxygen, solar radiation,
impact particles, charged particle radiation,and molecular contamination.
The results of 16 participants in these studies are summarized.
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INTRODUCTION
The Solar Maximum Mission (SMM) spacecraft, built at the Goddard Space Flight Center,
was launched in February 1980 with solar flare research its primary objective. Launched near
the peak of the I l-year solar cycle, the SMM was put in a 310 nm, nearly circular orbit with
28.5 ° inclination. The spacecraft's longitudinal axis was pointing at the Sun in a 3-axis
stabilized mode, so that the seven instruments aboard the spacecraft could monitor the activities
of the Sun. Some of the instruments required very fine pointing accuracy and stability to obtain
high-resolution data. During the initial period, the pointing accuracy of the SMM was better
than 2 arc-sec with stability less than 1 arc-sec.
The following instruments were carried by the SMM spacecraft:
Active Cavity Radiometer Irradiance Monitor
Coronagraph/Polarimeter (C/P)
Gamma Ray Spectrometer
Hard X-Ray Burst Spectrometer
Hard X-Ray Imaging Spectrometer
Ultraviolet Spectrometer/Polarimeter
X-Ray Polychromator
Six of the instruments were designed to observe solar flares in regions of the electromagnetic
spectrum ranging from visible light through ultraviolet and x-ray emission to gamma rays. The
seventh instrument, the Active Cavity Radiometer lrradiance Monitor, monitored the Sun's total
radiation.
Equipment and Instrument Failures
The first months of the mission were very successful. The spacecraft and the instruments
operated flawlessly with hundreds of flares monitored and recorded. In September 1980, about
6 1/2 months after launch, one of the three gyro channels (Channel C) of the NASA Inertial
Reference Unit failed. The required attitude control was maintained, however, without
performance degradation by the two remaining gyro channels (A and B) until November 1980,
when three fuses burned out in the reaction wheel control circuits. In December 1980, a yaw
magnetic torquer also failed. A coarse attitude control mode was established using the
remaining magnetic torquers. The spacecraft was spin stabilized at a rotation rate of I deg/sec
with a coning motion that moved the Sun pointing spacecraft axis up to 15° off the Sun line.
Only two of the seven instruments were 100% operational (Gamma Ray Spectrometer and Hard
X-Ray Burst Spectrometer) since they did not require precise pointing. One instrument
functioned with limited capability (Active Cavity Radiometer lrradiance Monitor). Two of the
instruments were not able to operate due to the backup attitude control mode (Ultraviolet
Spectrometer/Polarimeter and X-Ray Polychromator) and two others had failed and were
inoperative (Coronagraph/Polarimeter and Hard X-Ray Imaging Spectrometer).
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Solar Maximum Repair Mission
The Solar Max spacecraft was the first spacecraft designed to be serviced and repaired in
space by the Space Shuttle crew. The Modular Attitude Control System (MACS) module was
designed to be an orbital replacement unit, but the instrument repair was more complex because
the Instrument Module (IM) was not designed to be repaired or replaced in orbit. Of the two
failed scientific instruments, only the C/P was considered repairable. An identical spare MACS
module was available from the Landsat program and a new C/P Main Electronics Box (MEB)
was built specifically for the repair mission.
The Solar Maximum Repair Mission (SMRM) was performed by the crew of the STS flight
41-C in April 1984. By this time the SMM orbit altitude had decayed to 265 nm. Attempts by
the astronaut using the Manned Maneuvering Unit (MMU) to dock to the spacecraft and to
stop its rotation failed. The docking attempts imparted to the spacecraft uncontrollable roll,
pitch and yaw rates. After the spacecraft was stabilized using specially uplinked software, the
spacecraft was grappled by the Orbiter's Remote Manipulator System (RMS) and placed on the
Flight Support System (FSS) located in the Orbiter Bay.
The MACS module was removed from the SMM and placed on its temporary storage fixture
on the FSS. After the new module was mounted on the SMM, the old module was secured in
its landing location on the lower starboard side of the FSS. The entire MACS module
replacement took less than an hour.
The replacement of the Main Electronics Box of the Coronagraph/Polarimeter was the next
repair operation. The MEB was replaced successfully, even though it was not designed for
servicing. The faulty MEB was stowed in a storage area in the FSS tool locker for return to
Earth.
After the replacement of the faulty equipment, the SMM was checked out and deployed to
provide more data near the Sun's least active solar flare period. The Orbiter landed two days
later on April 14, 1984.
Post-Flight Handling of Returned Equipment
After landing at Edwards Air Force Base in California, the Orbiter and its returned payload
were flown on the 747 to the Kennedy Space Center (KSC). After three days in the Orbiter
Processing Facility (OPF), the FSS with MACS attached was removed from the Orbiter and
transported to the Operations and Checkout (O&C) building.
Because of concern that contamination may mask the environmental effects on the returned
equipment, the MACS and the MEB were bagged while in the O&C building and under QA
control with rigid handling limitations. The MACS and MEB were removed from the FSS and
placed in their respective storage containers. A one square foot wash plate and a fallout
grid/surface had been attached to the MACS in the OPF before removal from the Orbiter to
monitor molecular and particulate contaminants deposited from the time the MACS was taken
out of the Orbiter bay to when it was unpacked at GSFC. The same procedure was used with
MEB but the sequence started at the O&C building where the MEB was removed from the FSS
tool locker.
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Cleanroom attirewasusedby thehandlingpersonnelat all times.Exceptfor thetime when
theunits (MACS& MEB) werepackedin their separateshippingcontainers,theunitswere
protectedfrom contaminationby baggingmadeof Capran518.Whenthewashplatesand
fallout plateswereremovedafter unpackingthe units at theGSFC,analysesindicatedthat the
protectedsurfaceswerein betterconditionthan requiredby Mil Std 1246Alevel100A.
Thereturnedhardwarewasstoredin a _:lass10,000cleanroomat the GSFC.Thermalblankets
werecarefullycut andremoved,thenstoredin displaycontainers.
Post-Flight Analysis
The returned MACS unit and the MEB of the Coronagraph/Polarimeter offered an
opportunity to examine the hardware in an effort to determine the causes of the failures and_to
study the effects of 50 months exposure to the Low Earth Orbit (LEO) environment. Natural
orbital environments, such as solar ultraviolet radiation, charge particles, atomic oxygen, and
micrometeroids have been demonstrated to degrade thermal radiative properties like solar
absorptance, and material mechanical properties such as elongation and tensile strength. More
subtle effects on surface electrical properties have also been observed. Similar effects can be
caused by self-induced environments, such as molecular and particulatecontamination and by
space debris carried into orbit (or created) by the launch vehicle, the spacecraft, or the payload.
The atomic oxygen and space debris effects were for the most part noted from experiments
on STS-3 to 8. The contrasts in effects should provide a gauge to assess the reliability of
Orbiter based testing of materials for higher altitude and longer term predictions.
HARDWARE ANALYSES
Main Electronic Box
The Main Electronic Box (MEB) provides the control and data handling functions for the
Coronagraph/Polarimeter (C/P) instrument. The coronagraph creates an artificial total eclipse
of the Sun by using a series of external disks to prevent direct sunlight from falling on the
objective lens of the telescope. The C/P operated successfully taking pictures of Sun's corona
for 5 months after launch before the first failure occurred. Fortunately, the failed microcircuit
could be bypassed by ground software. The second failure in the electronics occurred about a
month later, August 8, 1980, but the instrument was kept operating with only an occasional loss
of data. The third electronics failure occurred in early September, but a solution to prevent
unnecessary shutdowns was found by modifying the onboard software. The terminal failure in
the electronics occurred on September 23, 1980, which rendered the instrument inoperative.
Subsequent post-flight analysis showed that all the failures occurred in one type of integrated
circuit MM54CI61J/883B manufactured by National Semiconductor. There were a total of 21
such microcircuits in use of which three failed. Electrical testing of two of the devices isolated
the failures to short circuited transistors. The third device could not be tested because of
damage during removal from the PC board. The short circuits were caused by defects in the
gate oxide material as a result of time, temperature and applied bias voltage. Several oxide
defects were also observed in the third device.
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In addition,nineNationalSemiconductorMM54CI61Jmicrocircuitswereremovedfrom the
MEB andtested.All ninedeviceshadbeenoperatingproperlyon theMEB. Two of the devices
failedmarginallythe initial electricaltests.Onedevicefailed catastrophicallya staticburn-in test
at 125°Cfor 24hours.Thefailuresweresimilar to the in-orbit failuresof the partsof the same
type.Also thepartshadsimilardefectsin thegateoxidematerial,which indicatesa lot related
problem.Thereis somequestionaboutthe burn-inof thesedevicesbeforedelivery.A proper
burn-in is anaccepted eterminantof a partsreliability andwill usuallyweedout weakdevices.
Radiation Effects of Selected MEB Electronic Parts
A total of 29 parts of 9 different types were submitted to static, dynamic and functional
'electrical tests. The tested parts included flight parts and residual parts from the same date code
lot as the original flight parts. The flight parts had been under power or bias for the first 8
months and about 10% of the time thereafter. These parts also had a year to anneal at ambient
room temperatures on the ground.
The flight electronic parts showed no adverse effects due to the low Earth orbit radiation
environment. Complex linear devices _AI08A) begin to degrade at low doses and dose rates
and will be susceptible to failure at higher altitudes and/or longer exposures. More detailed
evaluation of electronic parts in orbit will be possible from the CRRES mission planned for
1986 and from the Space Station. Radiation detectors will then actually measure the
environment experienced by electronic parts which will be simultaneously monitored for
electrical performance.
Selected Hardware Studies
The evaluation was performed on the returned module retension system preload bolts, MEB
honeycomb panel epoxy film adhesive and the thermal louver blade polyimide adhesive.
The two returned bolts were tested for yield strength and ultimate tensile strength. The tests
showed no degradation in either category and the results were comparable to those of an
unflown bolt.
The MEB honeycomb panel evaluation produced a conclusion that there was no degradation
in room temperature bond strength of the epoxy film adhesive.
The returned louver polyimide blade adhesive was tested for lap shear strength and compared
with unflown specimens. The results showed an average of 65% reduction in shear strength as
compared to the unflown specimens. However, the reduction was not considered a severe one as
evidenced by the bonding which survived the action and environments in good condition.
The returned thermal louver blades had red nodules on both sides of the blades. Evidence
suggests that the red nodules represent regions of pure polyimide resin cured in space.
Infrared reflectometer measurements were performed on the returned louver blades and
compared with those of unflown spare louver blades. The results showed no degradation of
infrared reflectivity. Also the louver blade open and close temperature settings showed no
degradation. The measured post-flight settings were well within the specification limits.
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NASA Standard Inertial Reference Unit (DRIRU II)
The returned unit was the first production DRIRU II (S/N 1001) used as one of the
subsystems of the Modular Attitude Control System (MACS). The DRIRU is a self contained,
strapdown, three axis, dual redundant attitude rate sensing unit. Three orthogonally mounted,
two-degree-of-freedom gyros and a triplication of electronic modules and power supplies are
used to provide full operational capability with any two of the three channels. The gyros in the
DRIRU II are Teledyne SDG-5 Dynamically Tuned Gyros.
The investigation concluded that gyro channel C failed because of an intermittent electrical
short in the motor control logic. Because the failure occurred near the South Atlantic Anomaly,
much effort was devoted to determine if the failure could have been caused by radiation. After
extensive tests, it was concluded that radiation was not a probable cause of the failure.
Subsequent tests at the GSFC Parts Analysis Laboratory showed that the failures occurred in
three logic devices. Two of the devices failed because of an electrical overstress. As of this date,
the cause of the overstress has not been determined. The third device most likely failed because
time, temperature, and an out-of-tolerance logic supply voltage created a short at a latent defect
of the device. The defect apparently was caused by an irregularity in the manufacturing process.
(See 'DRIRU II Electronics Parts Analysis.')
After the system was reassembled with two substitute electronic modules, a full series of tests
were performed to evaluate the stability of the unit over the full operating temperature range.
Also the repeatability of the parameters as compared to the delivered state was investigated. The
test series were designed to repeat the complete 1978 acceptance tests.
The physical condition of the system was excellent with no apparent materials degradation.
There was no evidence of system performance degradation due to operational and other
environments. The system had excellent long-term stability of performance parameters over the
launch, orbital operation and retrieval environments during a 74-month period.
There was no measurable degradation of the shock/vibration isolators as evidenced by the
excellent alignment stability of the gyro axes through launch environments and over an extended
time period.
There was no evidence of structural or mechanical changes and no apparent outgassing or
degradation of exposed surfaces.
Examination at Teledyne found that the gyro ball bearings showed no excessive wear to
raceways, balls, or retainers. However, there was some dark colored, viscous residue mainly in
the ball tracks and the retainer ball pockets. (See 'DRIRU Bearings and Lubricant' for summary
of GSFC analysis.)
DRIRU Bearings and Lubricant
One of the DRIRU gryoscopes was disassembled and the bearings were returned to GSFC for
examination. The gyroscopes had been running continuously in orbit for 4 years at 6000 RPM.
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Thebearingsshowedsomewearin the form of tiny pits andscratch-linedeformations.
Numeroustiny particleswereobservedclingingto the bearingpartsafter thecaseandthe
hysteresisring wereremoved.Theparticleshad originatedfrom the pitsof the bearingraces
and theballs.
Thelubricantfor thebearingsis containedin theretainerswhicharemadefrom a porous,
phenolicmaterial.Examinationshowedthat thebearingswerelubricated.
Theconclusionwasthat the bearingsshowedlittle wearand hada sufficientamountof
lubricantleft to performwithoutproblemsfor their predictedlife of 5 years.
DRIRU I1 Electronics Parts Analysis
The failed part in the gyro channel C of the DRIRU II unit was an RCA CD4017AK
microcircuit, a decade counter. The part was submitted to the GSFC Parts Analysis Laboratory
for failure analysis. The tests determined that the failure was due to a short circuit through an
oxide defect underneath the output metalization. The defect was the result of a manufacturing
irregularity during processing.
Two other devices, an RCA CD4049AK and a CD4081BK, both microcircuits of the DRIRU
11 gyro motor control logic, were submitted to the GSFC Parts Analysis Laboratory for failure
analysis. Both devices had failed in flight due to a fused open die metalization track. A pin on
each of the devices was open circuited to all other pins. The fused open metalization was a
result of electrical overstress.
Remote Interface Unit
The Remote Interface Unit (RIU) was designed and built by the Fairchild Space Company.
The first application of the RIU was on the SMM spacecraft. The unit provides two-way
communications between electronic packages on the spacecraft and a central command and
telemetry unit (CU) which decodes and distributes commands and generates telemetry formats.
The CU communicates with the On-Board Computer (OBC) through the Standard Interface and
with the ground via the RF equipment.
The standard MACS module carries two redundant RIU's which have three operational
modes: 'OFF,' 'Standby 1,' and 'Standby 2.' The last two are sub-modes of the 'ON' mode.
During the flight, Unit A was operating in the full 'ON' mode (Standby 2). Unit B was
operating in the 'OFF' mode (only Bus Receiver/Control Logic and Power Converter
continuously powered). Throughout the flight, no malfunctions of the Units were indicated.
The RIU's were returned to Earth with the MACS module and Unit B underwent a post-
flight engineering evaluation from December,, 1984 until April 1985. The pre-flight tests were
performed in 1979.
Post-flight external and internal visual inspection revealed no degradation. Besides the visual
inspection, RIU B underwent two other kinds of engineering tests. Automated test equipment
was used to qualify the unit as a whole ('GO - NO GO'). In the other test, a parametric test,
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each parameter was evaluated separately. The parametric evaluation included.user telemetry
interface circuitry (active and passive analog linearity), phase lock loop performance, pulsed
output current and width, serial digital commands, serial digital telemetry, and power
dissipation.
The tests were performed at ambient temperature, -20°C, and + 60°C. The cold and hot
temperatures are the qualification limits. All parameters evaluated were found to be within
specification. When compared to pre-flight test data, in many categories the post-flight data
showed some improvement. The test results qualify the unit for reuse in another mission.
Three Axis Magnetometers
Magnetometers are used to sense spacecraft attitude with respect to Earth's magnetic field.
Two Three Axis Magnetometers, designated as the primary and secondary magnetometer, are
part of the standard MACS module. The magnetometers are fluxgate magnetometers which pro-
duce three analog signals proportional to the magnetic field components along their input axes.
The magnetometers together with the magnetic torquers provided an important function dur-
ing one part of the SMRM when they were used to stabilize the spacecraft's attitude. Only one
of the magnetometers was used during the SMM. The other, serving as a backup unit, was
never used because the primary unit did not malfunction.
After the magnetometers were returned to the manufacturer, they were subjected to the same
performance tests which were performed before the flight. The post-flight tests showed that the
magnetometers still satisfied the original specification requirements. The post-flight test data
nearly duplicated the pre-flight data.
Standard Reaction Wheels
The four Standard Reaction Wheels are components of the MACS module and are used for
attitude control and stabilization. They are essentially flywheels and work on the principle of ex-
changing angular momentum with the spacecraft body. Normally, three of the wheels are align-
ed with the principal axes of the spacecraft. The fourth, a redundant skewed wheel, is used to
replace any of the orthogonal wheels in case of a wheel failure. In normal operation it is run at
a bias speed to keep the other three wheels away from zero speed and to maximize bearing life.
After the return of the wheels to the manufacturer on January 24, 1985, they were subjectedto
visual examination, preliminary electrical checks, performance tests at ambient, hot and cold
temperature environments, and internal pressure measurements. One wheel, which showed a
slightly deteriorated performance, was selected for teardown.
Visual examination found the wheels in good condition. Preliminary electrical tests, continui-
ty, bonding, and isolation were satisfactory. The bonding resistance for two of the four units
was slightly above the requirements but was not considered excessive.
The internal pressure measurements indicated that the pressures were far below atmospheric,
confirming that the vacuum seal was still intact.
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All four units successfullypassedthe performancetestswith the exceptionof the 500RPM
torquenoisetestusinga .1 rad/sechighpassfilter. However,the unitsmet thetorquenoisetest
with the0.3rad/sechighpassfilter in the testcircuit.
Individually, two of the unitsshowedverysimilarperformanceresultsascomparedto pre-
flight tests.Oneunit showeddecreasedbearingdragtorquesand extendedcoastdowntimes.
Anotherunit had a 45%increasein dragtorquesand reducedcoastdowntimes,althoughit met
all requirements.It hadbeenexposedto a no-loadovertemperature(60°C)for approximately3
hoursdueto a softwareproblem.
Teardownanalysisof the overtemperature-exposedunit showedan 'asnew' appearanceof the
internalcomponentsandsurfaces.Thelubrlcationanalysisshoweda greaterlubricationlossin
thefloatingcartridgesystemthan in the fixedcartridgesystem.An investigationpackagein-
cludingcontaminationwipes,lubricantsamples,bearingcomponentsandphotographsof some
itemswassentto NASA GSFCfor analysis
NASA Standard Star Trackers
The MACS module includes two Fixed Head Star Trackers (FHST) which are used together
with the inertial reference unit and the on-board computer to determine and maintain the
spacecraft's attitude with the required accuracy. Because the star tracker is a very sensitive in-
strument, its image dissector tube must be adequately protected from high level light sources
such as the Sun. This was done by providing light shades and a shutter operated by a bright ob-
ject sensor. At the time of the grappling attempt, the trackers and the shutter were powered-off.
They remained in this condition until recovery.
The cathode of the image dissector tube detector was extensively damaged by the Sun follow-
ing the attempts by the astronaut to dock with the spacecraft using the Manned Maneuvering
Unit (MMU). The spacecraft was tumbling out of control for many hours before it was finally
stabilized so that it could be grappled by the Remote Manipulator System. The tumbling expos-
ed the sensitive cathode to the Sun causing permanent degradation. This prevented proper
operation of the tracker after return to Earth and made comparison with pre-flight
characteristics impossible. Otherwise, the tracker functioned nominally during testing at the
GSFC and the Kennedy Space Center.
The trackers performed flawlessly during the Solar Maximum Mission. Because of inconsisten-
cies in the flight data, some questions arose about the position calibration and alignment. The
inconsistencies were attributed partly to a new calibration method and partly to the scarcity of
flight data.
During the period from the spacecraft failure to just prior to recovery, the trackers were used
occasionally, but were always adequately protected by the shutter.
The tests discovered that the 'tracks' made by the Sun across the cathode were insensitive
regions which could not produce an adequate signal to track a star. It was also discovered that
the lens of tracker S/N 001 had on its surface large peelings from the lens coating.
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MATERIALS ANALYSES
Materials analyses have been performed on materials retrieved from the Solar Max thermal
control system, and on various impact particles that were imbedded in the thermal control
materials. The materials analyzed were aluminized Kapton and Mylar, and Dacron netting from
the multilayer insulation (MLI) blankets, and silver Teflon used on a thermal radiator and as
trim on louver assemblies.
MLI is used to thermally insulate various spacecraft components. The portions of the MLI
returned to Earth are primarily from the blankets used to insulate the MACS. Other pieces are
from the blanket that covered the Main Electronics Box of the Coronagraph/Polarimeter.
Aluminized Kapton is used for the top layer of the MLI. Other layers of the MLI are aluminiz-
ed Kapton (MACS) or aluminized Mylar (MEB) separated by Dacron netting. A summary of
the analyses is reported in the following section.
Silver Teflon is used on spacecraft components to increase the thermal radiation performance
of exposed surfaces. The silver Teflon removed from the MACS is from the thermal louver
assembly.
The chemistry of various impact particles, both natural and man made, has been analyzed.
These impact particles were found imbedded in the MLI and in the thermal louvers. A summary
of these analyses is reported in section 'Impact Particles.'
Insulation Materials
There are two different forms of MLI insulation blankets returned to Earth from the Solar
Max. In both forms, the top layer is made of Kapton with an aluminum layer vapor deposited
on the inside surface. The bottom layer, the layer facing the spacecraft systems, is also made of
aluminized Kapton, with the aluminum facing the inner layers of the MLI. In both forms, every
layer is separated and supported by a Dacron mesh.
The MLI blankets that covered the MACS are composed entirely of aluminized Kapton. The
top and bottom layers are made of 2 mil Kapton. There are six to ten inner layers of 1/4 mil
Kapton, aluminized on both sides. The MLI taken from the Main Electronics Box is made of
aluminized Kapton and aluminized Mylar. The top layer is 3 rail Kapton and the bottom layer
is 1 mil Kapton. There are fifteen inner layers of 1/4 mil Mylar, aluminized on both sides.
The MLI materials have been analyzed by various investigators primarily using optical
microscopes and Scanning Electron Microscopes (SEM). In addition, infrared spectroscopy was
used to detect potential changes in the Kapton polymer structure, and a solar reflectometer
measured solar absorptance. Measurements have been made of Kapton samples by exposing
them to low pressure atomic oxygen discharge, to a microwave discharge rich in ultraviolet and
to a 3 Kv argon ion beam under high vacuum conditions.
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Aluminized Kaoton Degradation
The most apparent change in the MLI is the dull appearance of the top Kapton layers as
compared to the shiny surface of new Kapton samples. Thus, studies of the MLI samples have
concentrated on a possible degradation of the Kapton material. Observations show the outer
Kapton surface to be eroded, thereby creating the dull appearance. This finding is similar to the
results of tests performed on-orbit during the STS-8 mission. Findings on STS-8 as well as
SMM indicate that changes in the Kapton are most likely due to the presence of atomic oxygen.
Degradation of the Kapton surface appears to be greater in areas cleaned during preflight
operations with an alcohol based solvent. The same study has revealed tunnel-like substructurcs
under the Kapton surface in the region of,the interface between the alcohol wiped and non-
wiped areas. It- is believed that this is caused by the diffusion of atomic oxygen through the
surface and reaction with the underlying polymers. Associated with the thin tunnel surfaces are
small holes believed to be the result of atomic oxygen and UV interaction.
Infrared spectroscopy indicates that while there is obvious degradation in the Kapton, the
actual polymer structure has not changed. Measurements of thickness of the top Kapton layer
from the front of the MACS indicate that the Kapton suffered mass losses ranging from 0.54
percent to 31.4 percent. One sample from the bottom of the MACS suffered a 41 percent mass
loss.
In order to more specifically determine the cause of the Kapton mass losses, Kapton samples
were exposed to a variety of atomic oxygen sources, ion sources and ultraviolet (UV) sources.
These tests suggest that the greatest surface etching is due to a combination of atomic oxygen
coupled with exposure to UV. The angle at which the surface is exposed to these elements is
probably significant.
Studies of the back side of the top Kapton layer from the MEB have revealed areas where the
"deposited aluminum is missing. These areas include scratches most likely caused by the handling
of the MLI. Other areas are pinhole in size in a regular pattern, causing the illusion of
penetrations in the transparent Kapton layer. These transparent pinholes appear to correspond
with the knots in the underlying Dacron mesh, leading to the speculation that the knots have
rubbed the aluminum off. While some surface holes appear to be the result of atomic oxygen
and UV interaction or the illusion of transparent Kapton, other surface holes appear to be the
result of particle impacts. Not all of these holes show a total penetration. The subject of
particle impacts is discussed in section 'Impact Particles.'
The significance of the Kapton degradation to spacecraft designers lies in potential changes in
the MLI performance. Measurements have been made of sola.r absorptance of the Kapton
material. The solar absorptance of the Kapton material is typically 0.37 to 0.41 prior to on-orbit
exposure. The post-flight measurements indicate that the solar absorptance of the SMM Kapton
samples has increased by 0.03 to 0.04. This increase is probably due to the optical scattering
effect of the degraded Kapton surface. This small increase should have little effect on the
performance of the MLI insulation blankets. However, greater degradation of the top Kapton
layer that may significantly affect the performance of the MLI, cannot be ruled out in future
missions.
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Inner Layer Material Degradation
An examination has been made of the aluminized Mylar films and the Dacron mesh from the
inner layers of the MLI which was used to cover the MEB. Optical microscopes of up to 400
power have revealed no erosion in these materials. The only apparent damage to these materials
was caused by the impact particles (see 'Impact Particles').
Silver Teflon
Silver Teflon is a thin Teflon film on which a layer of silver is vapor deposited. A layer of
Inconel is deposited on the silver for protection from the environment. The Teflon film used on
the SMM spacecraft is 5 mils thick with a 1500 Angstrom thick layer of silver and a 100
Angstrom thick layer of Inconei. Silver Teflon is used in the thermal protection system to
increase the thermal radiative performance of various exposed surfaces. The film is normally
applied so that the Teflon side is exposed to the orbit environment.
All silver Teflon samples given to investigators for analyses were exposed to the orbit
environment on the Teflon side. Some material was also exposed on the silver/lnconel side, due
to its unique application as trim on the MACS louver system (see 'Post-Flight Photographs'). It
has been found in both cases that the surfaces were affected by the long duration exposure.
The silver Teflon has been analyzed, as in the case of aluminized Kapton, primarily with
optical and Scanning Electron Microscopes. The absorptance of exposed samples has been
measured and Energy Dispersive X-Ray Analysis (EDAX) has been used in conjunction with
SEM to detect the presence of trace elements. Some samples have been tested with exposure to
low pressure atomic oxygen discharge, and other samples have been subjected to tensile strength
testing.
Teflon Surface Degradation
Observations of Teflon exposed surfaces show evidence of a reaction to the orbit
environment. Unexposed Teflon is smooth in appearance, while the exposed Teflon has been
described as having a 'bristle-like' reaction pattern.
The bristle-like structures in exposed Teflon have also been described as cone-like structures.
These adjacent cones are easily visible in magnified views of Teflon samples exposed to atomic
oxygen and UV. The cause of this Teflon degradation has been studied by exposing a new
sample of silver Teflon to atomic oxygen alone. Although the Teflon surface was no longer
smooth, it did not have the deep cone structures of the SMM samples. There is speculation that
a combination of atomic oxygen fluence and UV exposure will cause a more severe Teflon
reaction than atomic oxygen alone, resulting in the cone structures.
Teflon is a fluorocarbon polymer. It has been found that exposure to atomic oxygen depletes
Teflon of fluorine. This is evidenced by an increase in the detected carbon/fluorine ratio.
Further study is required to determine if longer on-orbit exposures would result in any further
breakdown of Teflon.
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Silver/lnconel Surface Degradation
The samples exposed on the silver/lnconel surface also show reaction to the orbit
environment. Reactions range from cracks in the Inconel layer to a total depletion of silver and
Inconel. In the later case, the exposed Teflon surfaces of some samples have developed the cone
structures discussed earlier.
Many samples show the whole range of reactions. Between the extremes, a grain pattern of
silver/lnconel was formed. Nearing the silver depleted regions, the grain bodies become smaller
with the pattern of cracks more widespread.
The cracks in the Inconel surface may be due to temperature cycling under varying orbit
conditions. Other evidence has indicated that the reaction of Inconei with atomic oxygen causes
removal of the lnconel layer. Silver oxide deposits have been found on sample surfaces. The
silver oxide may have come to the Inconel surface through the apparent cracks after the exposed
silver reacted with atomic oxygen. Exposure tests indicate that the silver/lnconel depletion may
be caused by exposure to atomic oxygen alone, or to a combination of atomic oxygen and UV.
This suggests a mechanism for the loss of lnconel and silver. First, the atomic oxygen and
temperature cycling causes the loss of lnconel and the formation of cracks. Silver oxide (and
perhaps silver peroxide) forms and then flakes off in response to temperature cycling. This cycle
continues until Teflon is exposed, and the Teflon reacts to atomic oxygen and UV resulting in
the formation of the cone structures.
Tensile strength tests have shown that samples with eroded surfaces have no resilience.
Abrupt breaks appear to have occurred in the same direction as thermal expansion/contraction.
It was found that the tensile modulus of silver Teflon exposed to atomic oxygen decreased by
about 15070, while the modulus of samples exposed to atomic oxygen and UV decreased by
about 30°70.
Measurements have been made of solar absorptance of the returned Teflon material. The
solar absorptance of the Teflon film is typically 0.05 to 0.07 prior to on-orbit exposure. The
Teflon samples having the greatest absorptance change, appear to be those exposed to the orbit
environment on both sides of the film, and those contaminated by spacecraft outgassing. In
these samples, the solar absorptance has increased by as much as 0.22 to 0.29. This large
change in absorptance indicates a potentially large change in the performance of the Teflon
film. The solar absorptance of Teflon film samples with non-eroded silver/lnconel surfaces had
increased by a maximum of 0.04.
Impact Particles
A survey of approximately one-half square meter of MLI has revealed over 1500 impact sites.
Of these, 432 impacts resulted in craters in the Kapton greater than 40 microns in diameter. In
the 75-micron thick Kapton (MEB), craters greater than 100 microns in diameter are
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perforationsthroughthe Kaptonlayer. In the 50micron Kapton(MACS),craterslargerthan70
micronsin diameterpenetratethroughthe Kapton. When the survey totalled approximately 0.7
square meters of Kapton surface, about 160 impact craters penetrating the Kapton layer were
found.
A number of particles completely penetrated all of the MLI layers. One particle penetrated
the MLI near a star tracker, making an impression in the star tracker's aluminum shield.
Approximately half of the particles that impacted the MACS louvers penetrated the first of the
two aluminum sheets, as evidenced by impressions in the second sheet.
Chemical analyses of a number of the impacts has shown that sources of the particles fall
into one of four groups. The first group of particles is meteoric material, evidenced by the
elements silicon, magnesium, iron, calcium, aluminum with minor amounts of iron-nickel
sulfide. The second group of particles is paint particles. This is characterized by titanium and
zinc, and the chemistry includes potassium, silicon, aluminum and chlorine. The third group of
particles is aluminum droplets, probably from the MLI. The fourth group of particles is waste
particles as evidenced by one impact that penetrated three layers of MLI. The chemistry includes
sodium, potassium chlorine, phosphorus and minor amounts of sulfur. Investigators believe that
this particle may have come from the Orbiter's waste management system.
Two of the large impacts have been investigated in more detail. In both cases, the impact
particle apparently disrupted upon impact with the outer Kapton layer of the MLI. The
disrupted material was sprayed inward in a cone shaped pattern, lodging on the second layer of
the MLI.
In the case of the first impact particle, a small portion of disrupted material penetrated the
second layer of the MLI. This impact particle caused a hole 280 microns in diameter with a
raised rim. The second MLI layer has a ring of tiny holes and craters surrounding a roughed up
area of about 5 millimeters in diameter. Particles from the back of the first layer and from the
front of the second layer have been analyzed showing that about 75% are fragments or melted
droplets of Kapton. Of the non-Kapton particles, most are composed of magnesium, silicon and
iron. Next in number were aluminum particles. Investigators believe that the aluminum is
derived from the MLI. Other particles are composed of iron, sulfur and nickel.
The second reported impact particle caused a crater 355 microns in diameter with a raised rim
in the Kapton layer. The second layer has a wedge shaped pattern of concentric, elongated
holes. Particles of the second impact are composed primarily of iron, sulfur and nickel.
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INTRODUCTI ON
SMM FLEW FOUR YEARS IN LEO PRIOR TO REPAIR
- LAUNCHED TO 310 NM
- REPAIRED AT 265 NM
SMRM RESULTED IN THE RETURN OF:
-ATTITUDE CONTROL SUBSYSTEM MODULE
-CORONOGRAPH/POLARIMETER MAIN ELECTRONICS BOX
THIS PRESENTATION DESCRIBES FLIGHT HISTORY, OBSERVATORY ELEMENT5
AND ATTITUDES, RECOVERED HARDWARE, AND STUDIES PERFORMED ON THE
RETURNED HARDWARE, ELECTRONICS, AND THERMAL MATERIALS
SMM FLIGHT HISTORY
LAUNCH TO 310 N.M.
3-AXIS STABILIZED
SUN-POINTING
FEBRUARY 1980
ATTITUDE CONTROL FAILURE
WOBBLE UP TO 15 ° OFF SUN
ROTATING AT I°/SEC
NOVEMBER 1980
SMM REPAIR AT 265 N.M.
ACS, MEB RETURNED
APRIL 1984
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SOLAR MAXIMUM
MISSION (SMM)
OBSERVATORY
ENCLOSURE
-_NSTRUMENTS
SOLAR ARRAY
SYSTEM (SAS_
MULTI-MISSION HIGH GAIN ANTENNA
MODULAR __ SYSTEM (HGA$)
SPACECRAFT
(MMS)
SHM as seen by the Sun in the post-failure attitude (15 ° wobble),
ORIGINAL PAGE
BLACK AND WHITE PHOTOGRAPH
]49
View of MACS mndule after unsuccessful dock attempt. Most louvers
are closed. Degradation of the bottom-facing trim (Teflon) can be seen.
ORIGINAL PAGE
BLACK AND WHITE PHOTOGRAPH
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SMM in-bay after repairs completed.
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DEGRADATION STUDY WORKSHOP CHRONOLOGy
MAY 1984 :
JUNE 1984:
ISSUED INVITATION ON ALL AEROSPACE COMPANIES,
NASA CENTERS, DOD ORGANIZATIONS AND UNIVERSITIES
FIRST WORKSHOP MEETING WITH INTERESTED
PARTICIPANTS
- RESEARCH TASKS PROPOSED AND DISCUSSED
- RESPONSIBILITIES ASSIGNED
- BEGAN DISTRIBUTION OF MATERIAL AND HARDWARE
JULY 1984 TO
APRIL 1985: RESEARCH INVESTIGATIONS CARRIED OUT BY WORKSHOP
PARTICIPANTS
MAY 1985: STUDY RESULTS PRESENTED BY PARTICIPANTS AT GSFC
JUNE/JULY 1985: FINAL DETAILED REPORT SUBMITTED BY EACH
PARTICIPANT
SMRM STUDIES SUMMARY
_/EFA_E MATERIAL STUDIES
_I/_CIEAL
INVESTIGATOR
W. STUCKEY
R. FRISTROM
R LIANG
A WHITAKER
M MCCARG0
B SANTOS
D KESSLER
J PARK
ORGANIZATION
AEROSPACE
APPLIED PHYSICS LAB
JPL
MSFC
LOCKHEED
LANGLEY
JSC
GSFC
TEFLON ANALYSIS
KAPTON OXYGEN EROSION AND
OTHER SURFACE EFFECTS
TEFLON BULK PROPERTY
DEGRADATION BY OXYGEN
KAPTON EROSION RATES AND
MECHANISMS
TEFLON, KAPTON SURFACE AND
BULK EFFECTS
TEFLON, KAPTON SURFACE
CHEMISTRY, THERMAL EFFECTS
BLANKETS, LOUVERS SPACE
PARTICLE IMPACTS
TEFLON, KAPTON, CONTAMINATION
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SMRM STUDIES SUMMARY
PARTS_ COMPONENTS. HARDWARE
__AL
IN.V_E_IIGATQR ORC_NIKA_ ION
C. UPTON
H. FRANKEL
J. RITTER
J. UBER
R. LEE
A. ANSTEAD
R. MAURER
C. SUTTER
P. NEWMAN
SHONSTEDT MAGNETOMETER ELECTRICAL AND
MAGNETIC PERFORMANCE
FAIRCHILD RIU ELECTRICAL; MEM; HONEYCOMB,
LOUVERS MECHANICAL
TELEDYNE DRIRU ELECTRICAL, MECHANICAL
PERFORMANCE
GSFC - METALLURGY DRIRU BEARING WEAR AND OIL
DEGRADATION
GSFC/HAO MEB BOX FAILURE ANALYSIS
GSFC - PARTS DRIRU AND MEB PARTS MICROSCOPIC
ANALYSIS
APL COMPARISON OF IRRADIATED "NEW"
PARTS TO FLOWN PARTS
SPERRY WHEEL TORQUE AND POWER STUDIES;
MEASURE LUBRICANT LOSS
GSFC - ACS STAR TRACKER SENSITIVITY AND
ELECTRICAL PERFORMANCE
VERIFICATION OF IN-FLIGHT ANOMALIES
POST-LANDING ACS FUNCTIONAL TEST
- DETECTED OPEN FUSE ON 28V SUPPLY TO DRIRU CHANNEL C
- OBSERVED SYMPTOMS OF FUSE FAILURE THAT DISABLE REACTION
WHEELS
C/P MEB - BAD LOT OF NATIONAL MM54CI61 MICROCIRCUITS
- 21 OF THESE PARTS IN MEB, OF WHICH 3 FAILED ON-ORBIT
- DEFECTS IN GATE OXIDE MATERIAL CAUSED TRANSISTOR SHORTS
DRIRU CHANNEL C FAILURE ANALYSIS
- MANUFACTURING DEFECT CAUSED SHORT IN A RCA MICROCIRCUIT
- ELECTRICAL OVERSTRESS CAUSED FAILURE OF TWO OTHER RCA PARTS
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OTHER ELECTRONIC BOXES
ACS MAGNETOMETER AND REMOTE INTERFACE UNIT SHOWED NO ELECTRICAL
DEGRADATION
DRIRU CHANNELS A & B HAD NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN MECHANICAL OR
ELECTRICAL PERFORMANCE
STAR TRACKER ELECTRONICS HAD NO CHANGES IN PERFORMANCE DETECTOR
CATHODES DAMAGED DURING REPAIR MISSION
RADIATION EFFECTS ON PARTS
DYNAMIC AND FUNCTIONAL TESTS PERFORMED ON 27 PARTS OF 7 DIFFERENT
TYPES
- COMPARISON OF FLOWN PARTS TO RESIDUAL INVENTORY
- SOME RESIDUAL PARTS WERE IRRADIATED AND RETESTED
NO ADVERSE EFFECTS FOUND ON 6 PART TYPES, INCLUDING CMOS
COMPLEX LINEAR DEVICE (LM 108 OP AMP) SHOWED SLIGHT RADIATION
DEGRADATION
- WOULD BE SUSCEPTIBLE TO FAILURE AT HIGHER DOSES
BEARING AND LUBRICATED COMPONENTS
DRIRU BEARING SHOWED MINIMAL WEAR AFTER TEN BILLION REVOLUTIONS
- SOME SCRATCHES AND FINE METAL PARTICLES
- GYRO MECHANICAL PERFORMANCE SHOWED NO DEGRADATION
ALL FOUR REACTION WHEELS REMAINED WITHIN SPEC
- THREE WHEELS SHOWED NO DEGRADATION IN DRAG TORQUE
ROLL-AXIS WHEEL DRAG TORQUE INCREASED BY 45 PERCENT
- HAD EXPERIENCED TEMPERATURE > 60oC DURING FLIGHT
- DISASSEMBLY SHOWED i0 PERCENT LUBE LOSS AFTER 4 YEARS
IN SPACE
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DEGRADATION OF MECHANICAL PROPERTIES
MODULE PRELOAD BOLTS HAD NO CHANGE IN REMOVAL TORQUE
- NO DEGRADATION IN YIELD OR ULTIMATE STRENGTH
MEB HONEYCOMB PANEL ADHESIVE BOND STRENGTH WAS UNCHANGED
ACS LOUVERS SHOWED NO CHANGES IN ACTUATION TEMPERATURES
SPACE PARTICLE IMPACTS
1500 PARTICLE IMPACTS FOUND IN 1/2 M2 OF BLANKET
- i0 PERCENT OF PARTICLES PENETRATED ONE LAYER OF KAPTON
SPACE DEBRIS IMPACTS OUTNUMBERED MICROMETEOROIDS BY 2 TO 1
- PAINT PARTICLES, ALUMINUM, WASTE PARTICLE
ONE PARTICLE PENETRATED 17-LAYER BLANKET
ALUMINUM LOUVER BLADES (IM2) HAD 64 PENETRATIONS
NO PARTICLES PENETRATED BACK SIDE OF BLADE
JSC SPONSORED CONSORTIUM HAS BEEN STUDYING REMAINDER OF MATERIAL
QXYGEN/UV EFFECTS ON THERMAL SURFACES
KAPTON MASS LOSS SIMILAR TO STS EXPERIENCE
- EROSION PATTERN MUCH SMOOTHER
- MATERIAL STRENGTH UNAFFECTED
- SOLAR ABSORPTANCE INCREASE BY i0_
REACTIONS OF UNSUPPORTED SILVER TEFLON
- THERMAL CYCLING CAUSED CRACKS IN SILVER LAYER
- NEGLIGIBLE EFFECT ON THERMAL PROPERTIES WHEN SILVER
IS NOT EXPOSED
- SILVER WAS REMOVED BY OXYGEN REACTION WHEN EXPOSED
TEFLON SIDE ALSO EXPERIENCED SOME EROSION
- MUCH MORE EROSION WHEN EXPOSED TO UV
- SOME EROSION DUE TO REACTION OF HYDROCARBON IMPURITY
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@Close up of the degraded silver Teflon louver trim on the "bottom" side
to solar radiation and the atomic oxygen fluence on the silver/Inconel
side of the silver Teflon.
ORIGINAL P:__ F:'.
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SELF-INDUCED CONTAMINATION
ACS MODULE SAW FOUR THERMAL VAC CYCLES AT MODULE QUALIFICATION
- TEMPERATURE 10oC MORE EXTREME THAN FLIGHT
WHITE SUBSTANCE ON FINE SUN SENSOR, COMPOSITION UNKNOWN
- CONDENSED ON COLD SURFACE FROM WARM INTERIOR OF MODULE
SILICA BASED RESIDUE ON LOUVER FRAME NEAR MODULE VENT
- OUTGASSING DEPOSIT FROM OIL, THERMAL GREASE, STAKING, ETC.
- SIMILAR CONDENSATE AROUND VENT BETWEEN STAR TRACKERS
iiii
White powder residue from unintentional vent on sun sensor radiator.
ORIGINAL PAGE
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Silica based residue (circled on louver frame.
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IN-FLIGHT ANOMALIES WERE VERIFIED: OTHER ELECTRONICS BOXES DID
NOT DEGRADE
RADIATION DEGRADATION WAS DISCOVERED IN ONE PART TYPE
GYRO AND WHEEL BEARINGS_IN GOOD SHAPE
THE EFFECT OF SPACE PARTICLE IMPACTS MUST BE CONSIDERED IN DESIGN
OF FUTURE SPACECRAFT
EXPERIENCE INDICATED A NEED FOR AWARENESS OF UNINTENTIONAL
VENTING IN CONTAMINATION CONTROL DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
COMPARISON OF SMM AND STS RESULTS DEMONSTRATED VALIDITY AND
LIMITATIONS OF PREDICTING LONG-TERM LEO EFFECTS FROM STS BASED
STUDIES
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